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ABSTRACT
Audit logs serve as a critical component in enterprise business sys-
tems and are used for auditing, storing, and tracking changes made
to the data. However, audit logs are vulnerable to a series of attacks
enabling adversaries to tamper data and corresponding audit logs
without getting detected. Among them, two well-known attacks are
“the physical access attack,” which exploits root privileges, and “the
remote vulnerability attack,” which compromises known vulnera-
bilities in database systems. In this paper, we present BlockAudit: a
scalable and tamper-proof system that leverages the design proper-
ties of audit logs and security guarantees of blockchain to enable
secure and trustworthy audit logs. Towards that, we construct the
design schema of BlockAudit and outline its functional and oper-
ational procedures. We implement our design on a custom-built
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) blockchain system and
evaluate the performance in terms of latency, network size, payload
size, and transaction rate. Our results show that conventional audit
logs can seamlessly transition into BlockAudit to achieve higher
security and defend against the known attacks on audit logs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Enterprise business systems and corporate organizations maintain
audit logs for transparent auditing and provenance assurance [1, 2].
In addition to their functional utility, the maintenance of audit logs
is mandated by Federal laws. For instance, the Code of Federal
Regulations of FDA, Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act, etc. require organizations to maintain audit logs for data
auditing, insurance and compliance [3].
Secure audit logs enable stakeholders to audit the systems’ state ,
monitor users’ activity, and ensure user accountability with respect
to their role and performance. Due to such properties, audit logs are
used by data-sensitive systems for logging activities on a terminal
database. Often times, audit logs are also used to restore data to
a prior state after encountering unwanted modifications. These
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modificationsmay result from attacks bymalicious parties, software
malfunctioning, or simply user negligence.
Audit logs typically use conventional databases as their medium
for record keeping. Therefore, with databases, audit logs reflect
a client-server model of communication and data exchange. The
client-server model positions databases as a single point-of-trust
for the audit logs, and therefore naturally a single point-of-failure.
With this vantage of vulnerability, audit logs can be compromised
in many ways. An adversary with root access to the database can
manipulate critical information both in the database and the corre-
sponding audit log. Once an audit log is compromised, the safety
and transparency of the application is put to a risk. In the light of
this weak security model, there is a need for secure, replicated, and
tamper-proof audit logs that do not suffer from this shortcoming
and have effective defense capabilities to resist attacks. To that end,
we envision that blockchain technology can naturally bridge the gap
to nicely serve the security requirements for audit log management,
including ensuring security, provenance and transparency [4, 5].
Over recent years, blockchain has acquired significant attention
due to its use in distributed systems [6]. In peer-to-peer settings,
blockchain is capable of augmenting trust over an immutable state
of system events [7]. The most prominent example of blockchain
technology has been realized in Bitcoin [8]; a peer-to-peer digital
currency that enables secure transfer of digital assets without the
need of a trusted intermediary. Since Bitcoin, the use of blockchain
has become prevalent in various applications and industries includ-
ing smart contracts [9, 10], communication systems [11], health
care [12, 13], Internet of Things [14, 15], censorship resistance [16],
and electronic voting [17, 18]. The potential of blockchains is fully
utilized in an environment where, 1) entities belonging to the same
organization have competing interests [19] and/or 2) there is a need
for immutable data management whose security increases over
time [20, 21]. Because audit log applications meet the aforemen-
tioned requirements, they can intuitively use blockchain properties
for an added security of audit logs.
Applied to an audit log application, blockchain can replicate the
information contained in audit logs over a set of peers, thereby
providing them a consistent and tamper-proof view of the sys-
tem [22]. Blockchains use an append-only model secured by strong
cryptography hash functions. The security of data in the ledger
increases while the blockchain grows with time. Furthermore, a
malicious party intending to compromise the system will have to
change logs maintained by a majority of peers. This increases the
cost and complexity of the attack and increasing the overall defense
capability of the audit log application. However, the design space
of blockchain is modular due to varying access control policies and
consensus schemes. Therefore, it becomes a design challenge to
apply suitable structural and functional primitives that best fit the
application requirements and achieve the end goal of transparency
and provenance. Motivated by that, we propose a blockchain-based
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audit log system called BlockAudit. Broadly speaking, in BlockAudit,
we 1) capture system events generated by the data access layer of
an enterprise application, 2) transform the acquired information
into blockchain compatible transactions, 3) construct a peer-to-peer
network consisting of entities that evaluate and approve the au-
thenticity of transactions by executing a consensus protocol, and 4)
lock the transaction in an append-only and immutable blockchain
ledger, maintained by each network entity.
Contributions. In summary, in this paper we make the following
key contributions: (1) We outline security vulnerabilities in audit
log applications and discuss shortcomings of the prior work in
addressing those vulnerabilities. (2) We present a blockchain-based
audit log system called BlockAudit which addresses these vulnera-
bilities and ensures security, transparency, and provenance in the
auditing system. Towards that, we review the modular constructs
of blockchain systems and discuss suitable design choices that best
fit the requirements of an auditing system. (3) We test the design of
BlockAudit using a real-world eGovernment application, provided
by Clearvillage Inc, and analyze its performance using three evalua-
tion metrics, namely the latency, the network size, and the payload
size. (4) Based on observations made from theoretical analysis and
experiments, we discuss our proposed solution and provide future
directions for research on blockchain-based audit logs.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2,
we provide the background and the threat model. In §3, we review
the notable work done towards audit log security. In section 4,
we outline the problem statement and the design requirements
based on the limitations of prior work. In section 5, we present
our proposed solution called BlockAudit, followed by its analysis in
section 6. Experiments and evaluations are presented in section 7,
followed by a discussion and concluding remarks in section 8 and
section 9, respectively.
2 BACKGROUND AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we provide the background of audit logs including
their benefits and vulnerabilities. We also provide a threat model
for the systematic exposition of the outlined vulnerabilities.
2.1 Audit Logs
An audit log is an essential component in online transaction process-
ing (OLTP) systems such as order entry, retail sales, and financial
transaction systems [23, 24]. The OLTP system maintains audit logs
to monitor users’ activity and provide insight into the sequential
processing of transactions [25]. Each processed payment in OLTP
system creates a unique record in the audit log. The aggregate vol-
ume of transactions and the total payment made during a financial
year can be verified by consulting the data recorded in the audit
logs. Moreover, these audit logs can also be used to identify dis-
crepancies, anomalies, and malicious activities in payments. Audit
logs have to be secure, searchable, and readily accessible from the
application so that business users can easily view the chain of ac-
tions that lead to the current state of a business object. In Figure 1,
we provide an overview of the OLTP system in which an audit log
is generated once an authorized user commits a transaction to the
database. The transaction makes a change in the value of an object
and, as a result the change is recorded in the database and audit
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Figure 1: Audit log generation in an OLTP system. We an-
notate each step with a number to show the sequence of
progression. Notice that the user generates a transaction
to change the value from C to D, and the change is then
recorded in the audit log by the database.
log. These changes can be matched later with the database and/or
the application for auditing and provenance.
Benefits of Audit Logs. The audit log is widely used in modern
information systems to provide a chronological record of changes
being made to the data, and track the life-cycle of objects. Audit
logs are also used to verify and authenticate operational actions,
provide proof-of-compliance, ensure operational integrity, detect
malicious activity, and provide system-wide provenance [26, 27].
Organizations that use audit log applications no longer maintain a
paper trail for chronological record management, thereby saving
cost and storage space with additional environmental benefits. With
the elimination of the paper trail, the electronic audit logs are solely
responsible for establishing security and the correctness of sensitive
information. In the situation of an attack, the audit log is typically
used as a starting point of forensic analysis.
Audit logs also contribute to organizing user behavior in ap-
plications. Since audit logs maintain the user activity over time
and detect misbehavior, naturally, they promote responsible user
behavior and reduce the chances of misconduct. The users remain
aware of their actions being recorded in an audit log. Moreover, in
the case of an attack or a malicious activity, audit logs can be used
to ensure users are accountable for their actions.
The correctness of audit logs is imperative to find the cause of
the attack and initiate suitable countermeasures. For example, the
first step in identifying the solution to a system crash is obtaining
appropriate knowledge of the conditions that lead to the crash.
This knowledge can be obtained through audit logs which can be
used to reconstruct the conditions of an event. Such reconstruction
can correctly identify the root cause of the issue, such as network
failures, system bugs, or information tampering. Furthermore, after
fault detection, the system can be restored back to the original
state by rolling back transactions to the point in time prior to the
attack. Atop the real-time monitoring, audit logs can also be used
to identify system-related problems such as implementation errors,
software bugs, and deployment faults. Finally, audit logs can also
help in intrusion detection, by providing useful information to
detect unauthorized system access.
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Vulnerabilities in Audit Logs. Despite the aforementioned ben-
efits, audit logs are vulnerable to a series of attacks that may com-
promise the integrity of OLTP systems. An attacker can use multi-
ple attack vectors which exploit the known weaknesses in OLTP
systems and corrupt the state of the database and audit logs. Con-
ventional schemes of protecting audit data include the use of an
append-only device such as continuous feed printer or Write Once
Read Multiple (WORM) optical devices. These systems work under
a weak security assumption that the logging site cannot be compro-
mised, which eventually keeps the integrity of the system intact.
However, attackers have often exploited vulnerabilities at logging
site to tamper with data in audit logs [28, 29].
If the attacker acquires the credentials of an authorized user, he
can corrupt the database as well as the audit log. On the other hand,
if the attacker compromises the database by breaching its defense,
he can manipulate the database and prevent it from populating
audit logs. Then, not only he will be able to corrupt the database,
but also disable the auditing procedure by blocking the backward
compatibility of audit logs with the database.
2.2 Threat Model
To sufficiently analyze the vulnerabilities of audit logs and set the
security model objectives, we present the threat model for the
auditing systems in this section.
Inspired by the limitations found in the prior work [28, 29],
our threat model assumes an adversary that is capable of both
physically accessing the trusted computing base (TCB) and remotely
penetrating the OLTP system by exploiting software bugs. As such,
the adversary can be a malicious third party aiming to tamper
data to compromise auditing procedures. This would require the
adversary to obtain root privileges to the system, or have significant
knowledge of the system architecture. Additionally, the adversary
can also hack and acquire the credentials of a root user of the system.
This can be carried out using various attack procedures available
in the conventional attack catalog [30]. However, possessing the
knowledge of a private database system or a remotely acquiring
credentials of a root user would require exceptional capabilities
for the adversary. Therefore, we assume the third party attacker to
have strong capabilities.
In a less hostile environment, the adversary can also be someone
from within the system with root privileges. For instance, a corrupt
auditor, who has tampered data for personal gains, might want to
cover his act by changing data values. In contrast to the third party
attacker, this adversary will not need sophisticated capabilities since
he already has root privileges and the system knowledge.
For the system architecture, we assume an OLTP system similar
to a retail sale repository. The system implements the design logic
of an application using secure communication protocols such as
SSL/TLS. Moreover, the system has a database that keeps records of
sales and maintains a remote audit log. The audit log keeps track of
the database changes through transactions, as shown in Figure 1. In
such a design, the attacker can exploit the system by launching two
possible attacks, namely the physical access attack and the remote
vulnerability attack.
The Physical Access Attack. In the physical access attack, the
adversary will use the root privileges to corrupt the database. As
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Figure 2: An overview of Blockchain structure consisting
of three blocks. Notice that each block header consists of
the hash of the previous block. This relationship gives
blockchain, the property of an immutable ledger. Also no-
tice that the merkle root ensures that the transactions are
ordered in a sequence.
shown in Figure 1, the adversary will generate a series of trans-
actions to change the values of objects in the database. Once the
attacker manipulates the data, the database will automatically gen-
erate an audit log, tracking all changes made by the attacker. How-
ever, to evade detection, the attacker can either delete the newly
generated audit log or modify its values. Furthermore, the attacker
will also be able to tamper the history maintained by the audit log
in order to corrupt the auditing process. Therefore, in the physical
access attack, we assume an adversary inside or outside the system
who has access to the key system components.
The Remote Vulnerability Attack. In the remote vulnerability
attack, the attacker may only exploit the default vulnerabilities
in the OLTP applications such as software malfunctions, malware
attacks, buffer overflow attacks etc.. In this attack, the adversary,
although not as strong as the physical access attack may still be
able to contaminate the database and the audit log with wrong
information. Despite these adversarial capabilities, we assume that
the OLTP application is secure against the conventional database
and network attacks such as SQL injection and weak authentication.
Generally, database systems used by corporate organizations are
secure against these conventional attacks, and for the application
service used in this paper, we ensure this requirement is meet.
3 RELATEDWORK
In the following, we review the notable work done in the direction of
securing audit logging mechanisms. We also discuss the limitations
of the prior work in light of the threat model (§2.2).
Audit Logs. Schneier and Kelsey [31, 32] proposed a secure audit
logging scheme capable of tamper detection even after compromise.
However, their system requires the audit log entries to be gener-
ated prior to the attack. Moreover, their system does not provide
an effective way to stop the attacker from deleting or appending
audit records, which, in our case is easily spotted by BlockAudit.
Snodgrass et al. [33] proposed a trusted notary based tampering
detection mechanism for RDBMS audit logs. In their scheme, a
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check field is stored within each tuple, and when a tuple is modi-
fied, RDBMS obtains a timestamp and computes a hash of the new
data along with the timestamp. The hash values are then sent as a
digital document to the notarization service which replies with a
unique notary ID. The ID is stored in the tuple, and if the attacker
changes the data or the timestamp, the ID becomes inconsistent,
which can be used for attack detection. Ray et al. [34] proposed
a framework for maintaining secure audit logs in cloud comput-
ing platforms. In particular, their framework uses cryptography to
maintain integrity and confidentiality while storing, processing,
and accessing the audit logs. Ma and Tsudik [35] proposed a tech-
nique to generate an aggregate signature by sequentially combining
individual log entry signatures using forward-secure, append-only
signatures. This scheme provides provable security with efficient
space utilization; where the correctness of individual entry can only
be verified by generating the aggregated signature. Yavuz et al. [36]
proposed a scheme that stores individual and aggregate signatures,
where the storage of individual signatures increases the storage
footprint while allowing individual verification of signatures.
Blockchains. A blockchain is a data structure that enables trans-
parent and tamper-proof data management in distributed systems
[37, 38]. As such, blockchain consists of a sequence of data blocks
that are linked through on-way hash functions. Due to the one-way
property of hash operations, blockchain exhibit the append-only
model where once a data item is inserted it becomes immutable
[39, 40]. An illustration of the blockchain data structure is pro-
vided in Figure 2. Transaction ordering using blockchain is enabled
by multi-party consensus schemes [41, 42]. Popular among these
schemes are the proof-of-work, proof-of-stake, and practical Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerance [39, 43]. Roughly speaking, a consensus algo-
rithm is a set of instructions executed independently by each party
in the system. The execution is completed if a majority under fixed
bound obtains the same output from the computation. For more
on blockchains and consensus schemes, we refer the reader to [44?
, 45].
Blockchain and Audit Logs. Combining blockchain and audit
logs, Sutton and Samvi [46] proposed a blockchain-based approach
that stores the integrity proof digest to the Bitcoin blockchain. Bit-
coin uses a proof-of-work (PoW) consensus protocol. As we show
later in Table 3, PoW suffers from low throughput and high con-
firmation time. In particular, Bitcoin has a maximum throughput
of 3–7 transactions per second. Therefore, for audit log applica-
tions that have a high transaction generation rate, the concept
provided in [46] can be insufficient. Castaldo et al. [47] proposed a
logging system to facilitate the exchange of electronic health data
across multiple countries in Europe. They created a centralized
logging system that provides traceability through unforgeable log
management using blockchain. Cucrull et al. [48] proposed a sys-
tem that uses blockchain to enhance the security of the immutable
logs. Log integrity proofs are published in the blockchain providing
non-repudiation security properties.
4 PROBLEM STATEMENT & REQUIREMENTS
The prior related research provides the groundwork for securing
audit logs with blockchains and represent the foundation of our
work. However, our major contribution is seen in our focus on
audit logs related to enterprise business applications, focusing on
scalability and performance. As outlined in §1, blockchain appli-
cations may vary in their access control policies and consensus
schemes. Exploring the blockchain model for Enterprise business
applications would require an understanding of their requirements,
and methods to overcome the domain-specific design challenges,
which we explore in this paper.
Another limitation that can be observed in [33, 48] is the inabil-
ity to address Byzantine behavior among network peers. In other
words, the application assumes all participating entities faithfully
execute the consensus protocol without incurring any malicious
behavior. However, in distributed systems adversaries can control
a subset of replicas who can behave arbitrarily in order to with-
hold transaction processing and cause conflicting views among
other replicas. Tolerance towards Byzantine nodes is a function
of consensus schemes to be applied. For instance, permissionless
blockchain applications such as Bitcoin can tolerate up to 50% of
Byzantine nodes while maintaining operational consistency. On the
other hand, PBFT-based private blockchains can tolerate only 30%
Byzantine nodes. Therefore, the selection of a consensus algorithm
can influence the security model of the application. In BlockAudit,
we address the aforementioned limitations and present an end-to-
end solution constructed by transforming knowledge problems into
design problems.
4.1 Design Engineering
So far, we have discussed the benefits of audit logs, their key vulner-
abilities, and the existing solutions that address those vulnerabilities.
We have also presented a threat model to outline adversarial condi-
tions. In this section, we use this knowledge to make design choices
to meet the requirements of a practical blockchain-based audit log
solution. In the following, we define functional, structural, and
security requirements that we expect BlockAudit to meet.
4.1.1 Functional Requirements. An audit log application is expected
to ensure trust in the application data and provide tamper-proof
evidence of transaction history when needed. Data tampering has
to be prevented for the application data as well as the audit logs.
However, a priority is given to the audit logs, since they are used to
establish provenance. For this purpose, the audit log data should be
stored across multiple peers in such a way that it remains consistent
at each node, and therefore, hard to corrupt. If tampering happens
at any node, the system should be able to detect and correct it.
This requirement, however useful, comes with an assumption that
a majority of peers behaves honestly, and faithfully executes the
system protocols.
For audit data to be added to the blockchain, the participating
peers in the audit log network must reach a quick consensus over a
newly generated transaction. Since audit logs are generated in real-
time and persisted inside the database transaction, therefore, any
delay in using distributed audit logs adversely affects the system
performance. In order to prevent such delays, the system needs to
have low latency while maintaining the capability of processing a
large volume of transactions. Additionally, the application should
not add any data without consensus among a majority of peers.
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Figure 3: The network overview of nodes employing Block-
Audit. Notice that eachnodemaintains an interface that con-
nects them to the audit log application. They exchange trans-
actions with one another during the application life-cycle.
The audit log system architecture should be modular and service-
oriented so that it is possible for various types of applications to par-
ticipate and benefit from this system. Moreover, audit logs should
be data agnostic and must not rely upon the nature of data that is
stored in them. The business application should be able to provide
data in any format as per the requirements of the application.
Finally, the audit log system should provide searching and re-
trieval capability to enable the retrieval of any desired transaction
or a set of transactions (e.g., audit log entries for the last ten min-
utes, all audit log entries registered against a specific user ID, etc.).
The search needs to be fast and responsive to ensure the end user
is able to perform the audit in real-time.
4.1.2 Structural Requirements. Keeping in view of the design the
baseline models introduced [33, 48], we envision that BlockAudit
must operate in a distributed manner with application services
running on multiple hosts without a central authority. As such
each application peer would require its own blockchain node to
become part of the the BlockAudit network. The audit log system
should have a high throughput and should be able to process a large
number of transactions. BlockAudit should be able to support trans-
actions of various sizes since the transaction size varies in audit log
applications. The audit log system should be easy to integrate with
existing system with minimal structural and functional changes
in the application. It should also be independent of the underlying
application database. Finally, the system auditing should be secure,
transparent, and visible to all peers within the network.
4.1.3 Security Requirements. In the light of our threat model §2.2,
we require BlockAudit to be secure in adversarial conditions. To that
end, if the adversary launches a physical access attack, BlockAudit
should be able to neutralize it and prevent data tampering at the
source. If the adversary launches the remote vulnerability attack,
BlockAudit should stop the attack propagation across the network
peers. In other words, if the adversary exploits a bug in the audit
log of one peer, BlockAudit should immediately recognize the attack
and notify the victim peer. Furthermore, the infection should be
curtailed at the target zone, preventing its spread in the network.
Web Server
Business 
Logic
ORM Database
request request query
datahyderated 
objects
hyderated 
objects
webpage
request
modify / save save call
transaction commit
confirmation
hyderated 
objects
hyderated 
objects
webpage
Figure 4: The information flow between various compo-
nents of the application. Notice that the transaction is gen-
erated at the business logic layer, and once the database com-
mits to the transaction it is rendered on the web page.
In addition to the baseline attack model, we also expect BlockAu-
dit to remain secure in the presence of Byzantine nodes. Therefore,
if a strong adversary controls a subset of nodes in the network,
he should not be able to corrupt audit logs or delay transaction
verification. This can be achieved by either raising the attack cost
i.e., constructing a large network or relaxing anonymity so that the
adversary risks identity exposure by misbehaving.
5 BLOCKAUDIT
In this section, we show the implementation of BlockAudit. First,
we describe the eGovernment application that we used to generate
audit logs. Next, we show how a blockchain network is constructed
to integrate audit logs. In that, we describe the methods of gener-
ating transactions, creating a distributed network, managing the
access control, and developing consensus among peers over the
state of the audit logs.
5.1 Application Architecture
For BlockAudit, we use an eGovernment application provided by a
company called ClearVillage inc which provides software solutions
for various government operations e.g. property appraiser, building
permits etc.. The application uses a multi-tier system architecture
comprising of web and mobile clients, a business logic layer, a data
access layer, and a database. In the following, we describe the core
functionality of each component along with its role in generating
an audit log.
Web Applications. The web applications are built using asp.net
and users access the application services through a web browser.
Additionally, native clients are provided for Android and iOS, built
using their respective development frameworks. The web applica-
tion and web services are hosted on Microsoft’s Internet Informa-
tion Services (IIS) web server. The public side portal is available on
the Internet and gives public users access to information without
authentication. Atop this, a staff portal is provided to the organi-
zation staff which is only accessible from within the organization,
thereby providing another security layer.
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Algorithm 1: Creation of the audit log entry for
persisting new objects to the database
1 Function OnPostInsert(PostInsertEvent e)
2 if (e.Entity = AuditLog) then
3 return;
4 . Do not create log entry for AuditLog
5 if (e.Entity = AuditLogDetail) then
6 return;
7 . Do not create log entry for AuditLogDetail
8 if e.HasAttribute(AuditableAttribute) then
9 var new AuditLog(SessionId,
AuditEventType.INSERT,
EntityName, EntityId, UserId, Url);
10 for i = 0; i <
e.Persister.PropertyNames.Length− 1 do
11 if (suppressedProp.Contains(propName))
then
12 continue;
13 auditLog.AddDetail(propName, oldValue,
newValue);
14 if (auditLog.Details.Any() then
15 SaveToBlockchain(auditLog);
application uses a multi-tier system architecture compris-
ing of web and mobile clients, a business logic layer, a data
access layer, and a database. In the following, we describe
the core functionality of each component along with their
role in generating an audit log.
Web Applications. The web applications are built using
asp.net and users access the application services through a
web browser. Additionally, native clients are provided for
Android and iOS, built using their respective development
frameworks. The web application and web services are
hosted on Microsoft’s Internet Information Services (IIS)
web server. The public side portal is available on the In-
ternet and gives public users access to information without
authentication. Atop this, a staff portal is provided to the
organization staff which is only accessible from within the
organization, thereby providing another security layer.
Business Logic Layer. Business logic layer is an inter-
face between clients and the database layer, responsible for
implementing business rules. Among other functions, the
business logic layer also manages data creation, data stor-
age, and changes to the data with the help of ORM. Upon
receiving a request from the client, the web server instanti-
ates the relevant objects in the business logic layer, which
uses the ORM to send the processed object to the client.
The ORM writes changes to the objects in the relational
database management system (RDBMS) tables.
ORM. The ORM in the application provides a mapping
mechanism that allows querying of data from RDBMS us-
ing an object-oriented paradigm [41, 42]. Modern web ap-
plications are well suited for this technique since they are
multi-threaded and are rapidly evolving. ORM also re-
duces the code complexity and allows developers to focus
on business logic instead of database interactions. This
application uses NHibernate[43]: an ORM solution for Mi-
Algorithm 2: Creation of the audit log entry for
persisting existing objects to the database
1 Function OnPostUpdate(PostUpdateEvent e)
2 . Do not create log entry for AuditLog
3 if (e.Entity = AuditLog) then
4 return;
5 . Do not create log entry for AuditLogDetail
6 if (e.Entity = AuditLogDetail) then
7 return;
8 if e.HasAttribute(AuditableAttribute) then
9 var new AuditLog(SessionId,
AuditEventType.UPDATE,
EntityName, EntityId, UserId, Url);
10 for
i = 0; i < e.Persister.PropNames.Length− 1
do
11 if (suppressedProp.Contains(propName))
then
12 continue;
13 if (oldldValue <>newValue)) then
14 auditLog.AddDetail(propName,
oldValue, newValue);
15 if (auditLog.Details.Any() then
16 SaveToBlockchain(auditLog);
crosoft .NET platform. NHibernate is a framework used
for mapping an object-oriented domain model to RDBMS
and it maps the .NET classes to database tables. It also
maps Common Language Runtime (CLR) data types to
SQL data types. The ORM inside a database layer cre-
ates a SQL statement to hydrate the object and passes it
to the business logic layer. ORM also flushes the changes
to the RDBMS, and commits a transaction. Interactions
between the application and RDBMS are carried out us-
ing the ORM. In Figure 3, we provide the information flow
between various components of the application.
5.2. Generating Audit Logs
In this section, we show how the application gener-
ates an audit log once the user commits a transaction.
To implement auditing, three events provided by nHiber-
nate are used, namely IPostInsertEventListener, IPostUp-
dateEventListener, and IPostDeleteEventListener.
IPostInsertEventListener event is triggered once a tran-
sient entity is persisted for the first time. Each class
that requires auditing is marked with Auditable attribute,
which is then used to create audit logs for classes con-
taining this attribute. All mapped properties are then
audited by default and a suppress audit attribute is added
to suppress auditing of a target property. Usually, and
by default, all properties are audited. However, in spe-
cial cases where auditing is not required, the SuppressAu-
dit attribute is added to the property. In algorithm 1, we
show the process of generating the audit log when IPostIn-
sertEventListener event is triggered.
When an audit entry is created, it contains a session
ID (transaction ID), a class name, an event type (Insert,
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Business Logic Layer. The business logic layer is an interface be-
tween clients and the database layer, responsible for implementing
business rules. Among other functions, the business logic layer
also manages data creation, data storage, and changes to the data
with the help of object-relational mapping (ORM). Upon receiving
a request from the cli nt, the web server instantiates the relevant
objects in the business logic layer, which uses the ORM to s nd
the processed object to the client. The ORM writes changes to the
objects in the RDBMS tables.
ORM. The ORM in the application provides a apping m chanism
that allows querying of data from RDBMS using an object-oriented
paradigm [49, 50]. Modern web applications are well suited for this
technique since they ar multi-threaded and are rapidly evolving.
ORM also r duces th code complexity and allows developers to
focus on business logic instead of database interactions. This appli-
cation uses NHibernate[51]: an ORM solution for Microsoft .NET
platform. NHibernate i a framework used for mapping an object-
oriented domain model to RDBMS and it maps the .NET classes to
database tables. It also maps Common Language Runtime (CLR)
data types to SQL data types. The ORM inside a database layer
creates a SQL sta em t to hy rate the object and passes it to the
business logic layer. ORM also flushes the changes to the RDBMS
and commits a transaction. Interactions between the application
and RDBMS ar carr ed out using the ORM. In Figure 4, we provide
the information flow between application components.
5.2 Generating Audit Logs
In this section, we show how the application generates an audit log
once the user commits a transaction. To implement auditing, three
events provided by nHibernate are used, namely IPostInsertEventLis-
tener, IPostUpdateEventListener, and IPostDeleteEventListener.
IPostInsertEventListener event is triggered once a transient entity
is persisted for the first time. Each class that requires auditing is
marked with Auditable attribute, which is then used to create audit
logs for classes containing this attribute. All mapped properties are
then audited by default and a suppress audit attribute is added to
Algorithm 1: Creation of he audit log entry for
persis ing new objects to the database
1 Function OnPostInsert(PostInsertEvent e)
2 if (e.Entity = AuditLog) then
3 return;
4 . Do not create log entry for AuditLog
5 if (e.Entity = AuditLogDetail) then
6 return;
7 . Do not create log entry for AuditLogDetail
8 if e.HasAttribute(AuditableAttribute) then
9 var new AuditLog(SessionId,
AuditEventType.INSERT,
EntityName, EntityId, UserId, Url);
10 f r i = 0; i <
e. ersister.Pro ertyNames.Length− 1 do
11 if (suppressedProp.Contains(propName))
then
12 continue;
13 auditLog.AddDetail(propName, oldValue,
newValue);
14 if (auditLog.Details.Any() then
15 SaveToBlockchain(auditLog);
application uses a multi-tier system architecture compris-
ing of web and mobile clients, a business logi lay r, a data
access layer, nd a database. In the following, we describe
the core functionality of each component along with their
role in generating an audit log.
Web Applic ions. The web applications are built using
asp.net and users access the application services thro gh a
web browser. Additio ally, na ive clients ar provided for
Android and iOS, built using their respective dev lopm nt
frameworks. The web application and web services are
hosted on Microsoft’s Internet Information Services (IIS)
web server. The public side portal is available on the In-
ternet and gives public users access to information without
authen ication. Atop this, a st ff portal is provided to the
organization staff which is only accessible rom within the
organization, thereby providing another security layer.
Business Logic Layer. Business logic layer is an inter-
face between clients and the database layer, responsible for
implementing business rules. Among other functions, the
business logic layer also ma ages data creation, data stor-
age, and changes to th data wi the help f ORM. Upon
r ceivi a request from the client, the web server instanti-
ates the relevant objects in the business logic layer, which
uses the ORM to se d the processed object to the client.
The ORM writes changes to the objects in the relational
database management system (RDBMS) tables.
ORM. The ORM in the application provides a mapping
mechanism that allows querying of data from RDBMS us-
ing an object-oriented paradigm [41, 42]. Modern web ap-
plications are well suited for this technique since they are
multi-threaded and are rapidly evolving. ORM also re-
duces the code complexity and allows developers to focus
on business logic instead of database interactions. This
application uses NHibernate[43]: an ORM solution for Mi-
Algorithm 2: Creation of the audit log entry for
persisting existing objects to the database
1 Function OnPostUpdate(PostUpdateEvent e)
2 . Do not create log entry for AuditLog
3 if (e.Entity = AuditLog) then
4 return;
5 . Do not create log entry for AuditLogDetail
6 if (e.Entity = AuditLogDetail) then
7 return;
8 if e.HasAttribute(AuditableAttribute) then
9 var new AuditLog(SessionId,
AuditEventType.UPDATE,
EntityName, EntityId, UserId, Url);
10 for
i = 0; i < e.Persister.PropNames.Length− 1
do
11 if (suppressedProp.Contains(propName))
then
12 continue;
13 if (oldldValue <>newValue)) then
14 auditLog.AddDetail(propName,
oldValue, newValue);
15 if (auditLog.Details.Any() then
16 SaveToBlockchain(auditLog);
crosoft .NET platform. NHibernate is a framework used
for mapping an object-oriented domain model to RDBMS
and it maps the .NET classes to database tables. It also
maps Common Language Runtime (CLR) data types to
SQL data types. The ORM insid a database layer cre-
ates a SQL s atement to hyd te the object and passes it
to the business logic layer. ORM also flushes the changes
to the RDBMS, and com its a transaction. Interactions
between the application and RDBMS are carried out us-
ing the ORM. In Figure 3, we provide the information flow
between various components of the application.
5.2. Generating Audit Logs
In this section, we show how the application gener-
ates an audit log once the user commits a transaction.
To implement auditing, three events provided by nHiber-
nate are used, namely IPostInsertEventListener, IPostUp-
dateEventListener, and IPostDeleteEventListener.
IPostInsertEventListener event is triggered once a tran-
sient entity is persist d for the first time. Each class
that requir auditing is marked with Auditable attribute,
which is th n used to create audit logs for classes con-
taining this attribute. All mapped properties are then
audited by default and a suppress audit attribute is added
to suppress auditing of a target property. Usually, and
by default, all properties are audited. However, in spe-
cial cases where auditing is not required, the SuppressAu-
dit attribute is added to the property. In algorithm 1, we
show the process of generating the audit log when IPostIn-
sertEventListener event is triggered.
When an audit entry is created, it contains a session
ID (transaction ID), a class name, an event type (Insert,
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suppress auditing of a target property. Usually, and by default, all
properties are audited. However, in special cases where auditing is
not required, the SuppressAudit attribute is added to the property.
In lgorithm 1, we show the pr cess of generating the audit log
when IPostInsertEventListener event is triggered.
When an audit entry is created, it contains a session ID (transac-
tion ID), a class name, an event type (Insert, Update, or Delete), audit
ID, creation date, user ID, URL, and a collection of values for all
properties. The collection of values consists of the old value before
the update and the new value resulting from the update. Moreover,
d ring an updat , old and new valu s are compared. Only if the two
values are different from one another, the change is committed to
the audit log. In Algorithm 2, we outline this procedure of updating
audit logs. Currently, these audit logs are saved inside an RDBMS
using two tables, the AuditLog table, and the AuditLogDetail ta-
ble. Furthermore, Globally Uniqu Identifiers(GUID) are used as
primary keys in auditlog tables.
Once a change is observed in a class, the ORM’s event handler
is invoked. Similarly, the event ha dler is also invoked when the
change is observed in the “AuditLog” and the “AuditLogDetail”
classes. Lin s 2–5 in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, prevent the
creation of logs f r Audit Cl sses. In the absence of this condition,
the event logger would fall into an infinite event loop.The infinite
loop can also be prevented by removing the “AuditableAttribute”
from the audit classes. However, we use lines 2–5 as a check to
avoid the loop in case a developer adds the attribute by mistake.
Once an audit log is generated, the application provides a link
to the audit log page from the primary object. The link allows end
users to look at the object history and track any discrepancy caused
by a bug or malicious activity.
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Table 1: Clear Village’s actual transaction sizes in (bytes) for
the three transaction schemes, based on the transactions
from October 2018. The average size is between 32 bytes to
9,302 bytes.
Type Max Min Average
Per Transaction 501, 760 321 9, 302.81
Per Record 31, 104 319 2, 617.80
Fixed Length 32 32 32.00
5.3 Blockchain Integration to Audit Logs
In this section, we will show how audit logs, obtained from our
application, are integrated with the blockchain. So far in our de-
sign, we have an application that stores audit logs upon receiving
a transaction. Now, we need to convert the audit log data into a
blockchain-compatible format (blockchain transactions) and con-
struct a distributed peer-to-peer network to replicate the state of the
blockchain over multiple nodes. In our current implementation the
audit log is generated using the ORM,which calls a Representational
State Transfer(REST) Application Programming Interface(API) to
store the audit log entry.
We used the ORM to create audit logs because the ORM acts as
the gateway to capture all database transactions. Therefore, it is
efficient to take advantage of ORM events to capture all the database
changes and convert them into a JSON packet for the REST API.
Our design is flexible and generic, and can also be used by other
applications that do not use the ORM. Other than the ORM, the
application layer or the data access layer can also be extended to
capture the database changes in a JSON format and invoke the REST
API. Moreover, the REST API can also be used by applications built
using a serverless architecture.
5.3.1 Creating Blockchain Network. In BlockAudit, the network
consists of peers that all have the privilege of accessing the ap-
plication and creating an audit log. This network is connected in
peer-to-peer model [52] and each peer can connect to all the other
peers in the network. Connecting to a bigger subset of peers is
beneficial, because it can avoid unnecessary delays in receiving
critical information.
Access Control. As mentioned in section 1, access controls may
vary across blockchain application. These applications can be per-
missionless (open access) or permissioned (selective access). In
permissionless applications, such as Bitcoin, an arbitrary user can
download the Bitcoin Core software and join the network. How-
ever, in the private and permissioned blockchains, an access control
mechanism is applied that restricts the participation to only ap-
proved users. Since audit logs consist of sensitive data, therefore,
in BlockAudit we use a permissioned blockchain with access con-
trol provisioned to selected users. In permissioned blockchains,
adjusting access control is trivial since any custom membership
service can be used for the access control [53]. To avoid runtime
complexities, we do peer screening prior to network creation. The
peer screening is done based on the IP addresses in which we cu-
rate a list of IP addresses, compile them in executable code, and
provide the code to each peer. Upon executing the code, the peer
gets connected to the network.
Table 2: The description of fields of audit log JSON packet.
The packet has a header and a detail record for each updated
property. The detail records can have (0−n) records depend-
ing upon the class properties that are being updated.
Field Name Description
AppId Unique identifier for the application
ClassName The name of updated application class
CreatedDate Creation date and time for the audit record
EntityId Unique key for business object
EventType This would be Update, Insert or Delete
Id Unique id of the audit record, GUID
SessionId Unique Id for a transaction
Url Application page creating the audit
UserId User id, for the user making the change
Details
(0 − n)
Id Unique Id for the detail record
NewValue Current property value
OldValue Old Property value
Name Name of property e.g owner’s name
Listing 1: Blockchain transaction generated after serializ-
ing data from the audit log. This transaction is exchanged
among the peers during the application runtime.
{ "AppId":"USA -FL-0000005",
"ClassName":"SAGE.BL.InspSystem.PermitInspection",
"CreatedDate":"\/Date(1532366360155 -0400)\/",
"EntityId":161031 ,
"EventType":UPDATE ,
"Id":"9ceb8c2c -154a -49d5 -9441 -a92600db997b",
"SessionId":"c66207c8 -63be -4703 -b858 -cbfae98a988e",
"Url":"\/SAGE\/ Building \/ Inspection \/
InspectionReport.aspx?srcTp=309&srcId=17552018&
InspectionTypeId=61663",
"UserId":666 ,
"Details":[
{
"Id":"fa268eaf -7993 -48e3 -ae6a -a92600db997b",
"NewValue":"10",
"OldValue":"9",
"PropertyName":"DBVersion"
},
{
"Id":"ee2cdbc2 -9c3a -4bc9 -afba -a92600db997b",
"NewValue":"available after 1:00 pm",
"OldValue":"available after 2:00 pm",
"PropertyName":"RequestComments"
}
]
}
Additionally, each node is required to keep a copy of the blockchain
at their servers and maintain a persistent connection with their
corresponding application server. Persistent connections are nec-
essary to maintain an up-to-date view of the blockchain in order
to process, validate, and forward transactions, as well as to avoid
unwanted forks and partitioning attacks that may result from an
outdated blockchain view.
5.3.2 Creating Blockchain Transactions. Once the network archi-
tecture is laid out, the next step is to create blockchain-compatible
transactions from the audit log data. For that, we convert the audit
log data to a JavaScript Object Notation(JSON) format [54]. We pre-
ferred JSON over other standard data storage formats such as XML,
due to its data structure compactness and storage flexibility. To
obtain a blockchain transaction, we first pass the audit log data to
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Transaction ID : 9876523 
Class: A Type: INSERT 
Field Name: Field 1 Old Value: null New Value: xyz 
Field Name: Field n Old Value: null New Value: xyz 
Field Name: Field 3 Old Value: null New Value: 1000 
Class: B Type: UPDATE 
Field Name: Field 1 Old Value: xyz New Value: abc 
Field Name: Field n Old Value: xyz New Value: def 
Field Name: Field 3 Old Value: 1000 New Value: 100 
Class: X Type: UPDATE 
Field Name: Field 1 Old Value: abc New Value: def 
Field Name: Field n Old Value: xyz New Value: null 
Field Name: Field 3 Old Value: 100 New Value: 1000 
Figure 5: Audit generation for a transaction spanning across
multiple objects. Object A is inserted, B and X are updated.
Class: A Type: INSERT 
Field Name: Field 1 Old Value: null New Value: xxy 
Field Name: Field n Old Value: null New Value: xxy 
Field Name: Field 2 Old Value: null New Value: 10/10/2018 
Field Name: Field 3 Old Value: null New Value: 1000 
Figure 6: Audit Entry generation for a object. Object A is a
new object that is being inserted into the database for the
first time. An audit log entry only contains one object.
a function that serializes it to JSON and calls createAudit REST [55]
web service to create the audit log transaction. Each JSON packet is
then treated as a blockchain transaction, and as soon as a node in
the network receives a transaction, it broadcasts the packet to the
rest of the network. Nodes can connect to multiple peers to avoid
the risk of delayed transactions due to malicious peer behavior or
network latency. In Table 1, we show the average transaction size
from our sample system for October 2018. In Table 2 we describe
the purpose of each field in the audit JSON packet and in Listing 1,
we show the data structure of the blockchain transaction that is
obtained after serializing data from the audit log.
Log for table/class. The audit event logger can also create a packet
for each object in a transaction. We used this method in the prior
work [22] and found that the packet size was small, however, the
number of web service calls for each application transaction was
high. For instance, if a transaction contains 10 classes, it will create
10 web service calls. While 10 calls can be handled by ORM-based
audit logs, they are not optimal for blockchain-based audit logs.
Log for transaction. The audit event logger creates a packet con-
taining all insertions, updates, and deletions, that span across one
or more objects, and sends the packet to BlockAudit as shown in
Figure 5. Since the audit log data is consolidated, therefore, it is
hard to search for updates for a specific class, which is a typical use
Table 3: An overview of popular consensus algorithms used
in blockchains Notice that PBFT has high throughput and
low confirmation time.
Properties PoW PoS PBFT
Blockchain Type Permisssionless Permissionless Permissioned
Participation Cost Yes Yes No
Trust Model Untrusted Untrusted Semi-trusted
Scalability High High Low
Throughput <10 <1,000 <10,000
Byzantine Fault Tolerance 50% 50% 33%
Crash Fault Tolerance 50% 50% 33%
Confirmation Time >100s <100s <10s
case. Creating an audit log for a transaction reduces the number of
web service calls and improves efficiency, and this design is more
suited to blockchain based audit logs.
5.4 Consensus Protocol
The next phase in the BlockAudit design is the use of a consensus
scheme among the peers to develop their agreement over the se-
quence of transactions and the state of the blockchain. There are
various consensus algorithms used in blockchains, such as proof-
of-work (PoW), proof-of-stake (PoS), proof-of-knowledge (PoK),
Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT), etc. [56, 57]. In Table 3, we compare
the popular blockchain consensus algorithms. Notice that PoW and
PoS have high scalability and fault tolerance. More specifically, they
can scale beyond 10,000 nodes and can tolerate up to 50% malicious
replicas. On the downside, they have low throughput and high
confirmation time [58, 59]. In contrast, PBFT has high throughput
and low confirmation time. However, PBFT has low fault tolerance
which makes it less suitable for permisionless settings.
For BlockAudit, we use PBFT consensus algorithm [60, 61], which
was originally designed to facilitate the decision-making process in
a distributed environment. BlockAudit uses a permissioned blockchain
system [62], in which all network participants are known to one
another, and there is a weaker notion of anonymity. Since our sys-
tem is primarily a private and permissioned blockchain, therefore,
we are not constrained by high scalability challenges. Although
in the future, we aim to extend our design to a bigger network,
however, at the prototype stage, we are less than 100 peers. Due to
high throughput and low latency, naturally, PBFT is more suited
for our design.
In PBFT, the system comprises of a client that issues a request
(transaction), and a group of replicas that execute the request. The
primary replica orders transactions and relays them to other repli-
cas. The transaction is processed in four stages, namely pre-prepare,
prepare, commit, and reply. When the client receives a minimum
of 3f + 1 responses, f being the number of faulty replicas, the
transaction processed. In Figure 7, we provide an illustration of
PBFT, which we later use to design and calibrate BlockAudit. In
Figure 8, we show the complete design of BlockAudit, where the
blockchain is integrated with the serialized JSON output of the
business application.
6 ANALYSIS OF BLOCKAUDIT
In this section, we analyze various aspects of BlockAudit, including
design, complexity, and security analysis.
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Primary 
Replica  
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Replica  
Client  
Pre-Prepare Request Commit Prepare Reply 
Figure 7: An overview of PBFT protocol with client issues a
request to the primary replica. The primary then broadcasts
the transaction to all the other replicas. The replicas vali-
date the order of the transaction and share their view with
each other. Once the client receives the desired number of
responses, the transaction is considered validated. The pro-
cess of transaction verification follows four stages, namely
Pre-Prepare, Prepare, Commit, and Reply.
6.1 Design Analysis
In BlockAudit, each peer uses the ORM-based audit log application
that is connected to a database. Once the ORM observes a change,
it updates the database and issues a transaction, and sends it to the
primary replica. The primary orders the transaction and broadcasts
them to all the other replicas. Upon receiving the transaction, each
replica checks if the transaction is valid and follows the correct
order. The order of the transaction is ensured by the timestamp,
and the ordering rule involves the chronological sequencing of
each transaction. In BlockAudit, the primary preforms transaction
sequencing based on the time at which it receives transactions from
the application replica. We use this approach as a security design
choice to prevent malicious replicas from arbitrarily modifying their
transaction timestamps. In the following, we show how transaction
sequencing is performed in BlockAudit:
(1) An application generates a transaction at time ti and the
primary receives the transaction at time tj .
(2) First, the primary checks if the transaction respects the tem-
poral ordering (i < j, ∀ i, j ). This assumption is valid for
any real-world system, since each transaction experiences a
non-zero delay during transmission.
(3) If the primary observes a violation i.e., i > j, it assumes
that the application replica is misbehaving. Therefore, the
primary discards the transaction.
(4) In the transaction confirmation phase, the active replicas
also compare the time at which they receive a transaction
to the time of the transaction generation. This serves as
an additional security measure to ensure that the policy
precedence is respected, even when ignored by the primary.
In BlockAudit, we enforce the ordering of transaction since it is
critical in audit log applications. For instance, consider a case in
which txa involves a change made to a class. The next transaction
txb reverses the change made by txa , then it is critical to process
Business Logic  
Data Access Layer 
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Audit Event 
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Webserver 
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Web 
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Figure 8: Complete system architecture of BlockAudit after
blockchain is integrated to the JSON output.
txa before txb . Otherwise, the order will be violated and the audit
log will reflect a different state of the database than the actual.
In summary, BlockAudit constitutes of a client (audit log applica-
tion) that generates blockchain compatible transaction, a primary
replica that receives and orders transactions, and a group of active
replicas that execute PBFT to generate a blockchain-based audit
log. In conventional PBFT, the client is independent of the active
replicas that execute the consensus protocol. In BlockAudit, the
client is one of the active replicas that issues the transaction. In
the verification process, the issuer becomes the client and all other
replicas act as validators.
Key Takeaways. From the design implementation, we had the
following takeaways: (1) PBFT-based permissioned blockchains
are more suitable for audit log applications. (2) Extending ORM
provides an efficient mechanism of converting database transaction
to blockchain compatible transactions. (3) Existing application can
seamlessly integrate with blockchain based audit logs using ORM
extension. (4) REST based web services can also be easily extended
to support applications that do not use ORM. (5) JSON format is
the de facto standard for REST API’s, and therefore efficient and
suitable for an audit log transaction.
6.2 Complexity Analysis
A key aspect of PBFT-based blockchain systems is the time and
space complexity associated with the network and the blockchain
size. The time complexity partakes the time taken by replicas to
develop consensus on a transaction or a block. The space complexity
involves the storage and the search overhead that compounds due
to append-only distributed blockchain design. In the following, we
analyze these aspects of complexity in BlockAudit.
TimeComplexity.To achieve consensus over the state of blockchain
with n replicas, n2 − n messages are exchanged, as shown in Fig-
ure 7. Therefore, for each transaction generated within the system,
the overall complexity becomes O(n2). Compared to PoW-based
blockchains, in which the consensus complexity isO(n), PBFT has a
high message complexity which can lead to system overheads and
delays. However, we argue that in PoW-based blockchains systems
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such as Bitcoin, the total number of active nodes are over 6-8k [63].
In comparison, BlockAudit constitutes less than 100 peers. There-
fore, it can tolerate this complexity overhead, keeping in view the
other benefits associated with PBFT such as high throughput.
Space Complexity. The space complexity of the system can be
ascribed to the overhead associated with the storage of blockchains
at each peer. One major limitation of replacing the client-server
model with a peer-to-peer blockchains system is that each peer
is required to maintain a copy of blockchain. This leads to a high
storage footprint since blockchains are always growing in size. The
size footprint also increases the search complexity for transaction
verification. For instance, when a newly generated transaction is
sent to a group of peers for verification, they validate its authenticity
by consulting its history in the blockchain. If the blockchain size
is large, the verification time increases. As such, if the rate of the
incoming transaction is high, then high verification time may lead
to processing overhead, thereby increasing latency and reducing
the throughput. In BlockAudit, the space complexity of a system,
complementary to any other blockchain system is O(n).
Key Takeaways. From the complexity analysis, we had the fol-
lowing takeaways: (1) PBFT-based based blockchains have high
message complexity. Therefore, if the network scales beyond a few
hundred nodes, the application may become inefficient. Therefore,
we observe a tradeoff between the message complexity and the net-
work scalability. (2) Generally, the space complexity of blockchain
is high, due to the append-only model. In BlockAudit, the space
complexity is similar to any other blockchain application.
6.3 Security analysis
An essential component of our work is the defense against the
attacks outlined in the threat model §2.2. In this section, we discuss
how BlockAudit defends against the physical access attack and the
remote vulnerability attack.
Physical Access Attack. In the physical access attack if the at-
tacker acquires the credentials of a user, he can make changes to
the application data using the application interface. In this case,
his activity will be logged in BlockAudit. Since the log is kept in
the blockchain by the user, the attacker will not be able to remove
the traces of his activity. Therefore, when the attacker’s activity is
exposed, auditors will be able to track the tampered records and
take corrective measures to restore data to the correct state. More-
over, if the attacker is able to get write access to the database, he
will be able to change data in different tables. Since the audit log
generation is at the ORM level, therefore, these changes will not
be present in the audit log. This will enable the auditors to detect
malicious activity and take preventive actions.
Remote Vulnerability Attack. In case of a remote vulnerability
attack in which the attacker exploits a bug or vulnerability in the
application, the audit log will show the effect of the changes or
errors resulting from the attack. Additionally, the blockchain will
also preserve the tamper-proof state of the audit log prior to the
launch of the attack. As a result, the auditor will be able to compare
the audit log and the current data to detect changes made during
the attack. In the absence of the blockchain, if the attacker corrupts
the prior state of the audit log, there is no way auditors can re-
cover from it. However, with BlockAudit, not only the attacks are
detected, but the system state is also recovered. Furthermore, for
a successful attack in the presence of BlockAudit, the attacker will
need to corrupt the blockchain maintained by each node. Based
on the design constructs and security guarantees of blockchains,
corrupting blockchain repositories of a majority of nodes is costly,
and therefore infeasible.
After realizing that BlockAudit is able to defend against the at-
tacks outlined in our threat model §2.2, there are however few con-
siderations to be made while using PBFT-based blockchain model.
The prior work in this direction does not consider Byzantine be-
havior among nodes. In BlockAudit, we consider that peers may
behave arbitrarily and create confusion in the view of other honest
peers. Therefore, we want BlockAudit to be robust against mali-
cious replicas. While other consensus mechanisms such as PoW
may withstand up to 50% of faulty replicas in the system, PBFT, in
contrast, has low fault tolerance. In a situation where there are f
faulty replicas, a PBFT-based blockchain system needs to have 3f +1
honest replicas in order to function smoothly. Roughly speaking,
PBFT-based blockchains require 70% nodes to behave honestly in
order to avoid disagreements. However, in BlockAudit, we try to
raise the threshold of fault tolerance by making minor adjustments
to the security design.
Increasing Fault Tolerance. In a situation where there are r hon-
est replicas in a blockchain and the attacker is able to position f
faulty replicas such that 4f + 1 > f + r , then the attacker will be
able to stop transaction verification and may even cause forks. To
counter this, we propose an expected verification time window
Wt which will be set by the primary replica before passing the
transaction to the verifying replicas. The primary replica knows
the total number of active replicas in the system and can calculate
the total number of messages to be exchanged until the transaction
gets verified. In this case, the total number of messages will be in
the order of (f + r )2 − (f + r ). Let c × tb be the time taken for the
transaction confirmation, where c is an arbitrary constant set by
the primary replica. Based on these values, the primary replica can
set an expected time windowWt ≥ c × tb in which it expects all
peers to validate the transaction and submit their response. Let
tstar t be the start time at which the primary replica initiates the
transaction. If byWt the primary does not receive the expected
number of responses from the replicas, it will abort the verification
process and notify the auditor.
Depending on the application’s sensitivity, the primary replica
can either set another optimistic value ofW ′t , whereW ′t ≥Wt , and
repeat the process or it can simply abort the process and notify the
application auditors regarding the malicious activity. We leave that
decision to the audit log application and its sensitivity to malicious
activities. However, in our experiments, we relax the condition
of sensitivity and re-submit the transaction for another round of
verification. We set a new expected verification time windowW ′t
and wait for the response. Our choice of relaxing the condition
of sensitivity is owing to the unexpected delays in the message
propagation; given that our system would run over the Internet.
However, if the primary replica does not receive the approval for
the second time, it aborts the process and notifies the application.
Detecting Malicious Nodes. In BlockAudit, we also enable detec-
tion of the malicious nodes that corrupt the process of transaction
verification. For that, we store the identity of the replica in each
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iteration of the response. For instance, in the first iteration ofWt ,
we note the identity of replicas that send their digitally signed ap-
proval for the transaction. Let h be the subset of replicas that send
their response in the first iteration, where h ≤ (f + r ). The primary
replica stores the identities of replicas in h and initiates the second
iteration at t ′star t and waits for response tillW ′t . Upon receiving
the response in the second iteration, the primary replica updates h
and removes the duplicates. By comparing h with the identity of
all the replicas, the primary replica can find the malicious replicas
and request their removal from the verification process.
It is possible that an adversary, aware of the two-phased approval
process, may attempt to trick the system by sending a response from
a subset of malicious peers in each phase of approval. For instance,
the adversary can split his set of malicious replicas in f1 and f2,
where f1 + f2 = f . In the first phase of approval, the adversary can
send a response from f1 replicas. However, the adversary ensures
that 3f1 + 1 ≥ r , so that the transaction does not get enough
approvals to be accepted by the primary replica. The primary replica
will append f1 to its set of h. In the second iteration, the adversary
will incorporate signatures from f2, and the primary replica will
also add them to h. As a result, the primary replica will not be able
to detect the actual number of malicious replicas in the system.
To counter that, we randomize the two-phase approval process
to v-phase approval process, v may take any value of the primary
replica’s choice. When the transaction fails the first attempt, the
primary replica can either abort or continue the approval process.
Continuing from the above-outlined scenario, if v = 3, then the
attacker will either have to include one of f1 or f2 replicas in the
third phase. And if the primary replica iterates one more time, the
adversary will be bounded to include the set of replicas that he did
not include in the previous iteration. As such, the primary replica
will notice the incoherence in the response of a few replicas in
each iteration of the approval process, and the adversary will risk
exposing his malicious replicas. Although this procedure ensures
high security and the ultimate exposure of adversary in the process
of verification, it is, however, time-consuming and may lead to a
transaction stall. Again, we leave this to the primary replica, which
can make decisions that suit the application requirements.
Key Takeaways. From the security analysis, we had the follow-
ing takeaways: (1) BlockAudit counters the conventional audit log
attacks namely the physical access attack and the remote vulner-
ability attack. (2) Additionally, BlockAudit also makes audit logs
secure against Byzantine behavior, tolerating up to 30% malicious
replicas. (3) Leveraging the design policies in permission settings,
BlockAudit is able to detect malicious replicas.
7 EXPERIMENT AND EVALUATION
In this section, we present experiments carried out to evaluate the
performance of BlockAudit. First, we extended the nHibernate ORM
to generate a serialized JSON output in the form of transactions as
shown in Listing 1. The transactions are broadcast to the network
where a BlockAudit blockchain instance is configured at each node.
For experiments, we used sockets to set up the network and a
NodeJS client to receive JSON transactions.
Simulation Environment.We simulated our blockchain network
using a LAN setup at our research lab. We used 20 machines, each
running the Linux OS with Intel Core i5 processor and a 16MB RAM.
Next, we set up a virtual environment at each node to construct
a multi-host network. We assigned port numbers and sockets to
each host that acted as a peer. The socket connections were used
to exchange data with peers using IP addresses and port numbers.
Each peer was equipped with a JSON master list that contained
the information of all the other nodes. Data packets of the desired
size were generated and broadcast over the network. We encoded
the PBFT protocol in NodeJS and executed it over all the peers.
The selection of the primary replica can be done using any method
suitable for the application. In BlockAudit, in each iteration, we
selected the primary in Round-robin manner. To reflect the real-
world delays in our simulation, we manually added a round-trip
delay of 100ms in each transaction broadcast over the network.
Finally, once the transaction obtained sufficient approvals, it was
added to the blockchain of the primary replica, and subsequently,
all the other replicas.
We evaluate the performance of our system by measuring the
latency over the consensus achieved by peers. We increase the
transaction payload size from 2MB to 20MB and the rate of trans-
action λ from 200 transactions per second to 6,000 transactions
per second. By adjusting these parameters, we monitor the time
taken by peers to approve the transaction. Let tд be the transaction
generation time, and tc be the time at which it gets approval from
all active peers. In that case, the latency lt is calculated as the dif-
ference between tc and tд (lt = tc − tc , where tc > tд ). We report
the simulation results in Figure 9.
Simulation Results. Our results show that irrespective of the
payload size, the latency margins remain negligible as long as the
number of peers is less than 30. As the size of the network grows
beyond 30 nodes, the latency factor increases considerably. Fur-
thermore, we also notice that a sharp increase in latency when
the payload size changes from 5–10MB and a negligible change in
latency when the payload size changes from 15–20MB.
We also noticed that as the rate of transaction λ increases from
200 transactions per second to 6,000 transactions per second, the
confirmation time for transaction also increases. Intuitively, this can
be attributed to the processing overhead caused by the increasing
rate of λ at each replica. However, it can be observed from 9(c) that
within a network size of 50 peers, BlockAudit has the capability of
processing 1,000 transactions per second, with the payload size of
10 MB. This payload size is equivalent to 10 blocks in Bitcoin. For
the payload size of 1MB, BlockAudit achieves a throughput of 6,000
transactions per second. Considering low throughput of conven-
tional blockchains (3–7 transactions/second in Bitcoin), BlockAudit
achieves high throughput. This also justifies our choice of using
PBFT as consensus scheme for our system.
Evaluation parameters obtained from our experiments can be
used to define the block size and the network size, specific to the
needs of the application. As part of our future work, we will use
these parameters along with other consensus schemes to find op-
timum block size and the average block time for the audit log
application. By varying consensus schemes, we will be able to com-
pare and contrast the performance of various design choices and
select the best that can be used for BlockAudit.
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Figure 9: Time taken to reach consensus at different types of audit transaction with varying transaction rate λ (200-6,000
tx/second). Notice that as the network size and the payload size increases, the confirmation time for a transaction increases.
Also, it can be seen that the as λ increases, confirmation time increases. Naturally, this can be associated with high verification
delays with the bulk of the incoming transactions.
8 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
With BlockAudit, we were able to meet our overall objective of
securing audit logs using blockchains. We show with theoretical
analysis and simulations that our system is secure and efficient,
and it achieves high throughput(§7) by using the PBFT consensus
protocol. In BlockAudit, audit log transactions were seamlessly
generated with minor changes to the existing system. Moreover,
BlockAudit can be plugged into any enterprise business application,
that consumes a REST API to send audit log data as a transaction.
In summary, we successfully extended our application into the
blockchain paradigm to harden its security and increases the overall
trust in the application. Our system is robust against the physical
access attack and the remote vulnerability attack.
Limitations. Despite all the promising outcomes, there are, how-
ever, two major limitations in BlockAudit. The first constraint is
the high message complexity due to PBFT, and the second is a high
storage footprint due to data redundancy in the blockchain design.
Since in PBFT, the message complexity is high (O(n2)), therefore, in
adverse network conditions, PBFT may perform poorly, compared
to other consensus protocol [64]. In spite of these limitations Block-
Audit performs within the requirements of our application, and
could support PayPal [65] which processes 170 transactions/sec-
ond, however, our solution would not be feasible for Visa which
has a transaction rate of 2000 transactions/second [66]. Secondly,
audit logs by design have a high storage footprint, as each transac-
tion in the system has a corresponding entry in the audit logs. In
BlockAudit, the problem is further increased since transactions are
replicated on multiple peers, resulting in high storage overhead.
Keeping in view these limitations, we propose that high message
complexity can be resolved by using other newly proposed con-
sensus algorithms such as Clique [67], that belongs to the family
of Proof-of-Authority consensus protocols. Clique has a message
complexity of O(n), which is considerably lower than PBFT and
PoW. Using Clique may allow us to support a larger number of
peers, achieve high throughput, and reduce confirmation delays
of transactions in BlockAudit. However, in Clique, peers run into
the risk of multiple views at the same time. In blockchains, this
inconsistency is called a blockchain fork. These forks can lead to
temporary or permanent partitioning in the network. Currently, we
are exploring methods of fork resolution in Clique, and therefore
applying it in BlockAudit is part of our future work.
The space complexity can be reduced by adding data retention
policy and purging data after its fixed retention time. This would
optimize the overall size of the blockchain, and lead to less stor-
age and search complexity. In addition to these two schemes, we
also propose two other optimization strategies to meet the design
limitations in BlockAudit.
Another limitation in BlockAudit is the weak link between the
application and the audit log. In the current implementation, if the
application itself is compromised, and subsequently the audit log
generation fails, then BlockAudit will not be able to detect the fault
at the application. At present, BlockAudit enables applications to
seamlessly integrate with blockchain system and benefit from it.
Therefore, BlockAudit remains agnostic to the application itself and
the data being produced by it. As a result, we observe a trade off
between the seamless integration of audit logs with the application
and the enhanced security of the audit log generation interface.
Currently, BlockAudit is designed to facilitate the integration of
audit logs with eGovernment application. In future, we also aim to
focus on detection application-level faults in BlockAudit.
The latency is a critical problem in distributed systems, which
can be 1) latency due to the consensus scheme operation, and 2)
latency due to network conditions. To minimize latency due to
consensus, we select consensus algorithms, such as PBFT, which
is known to provide low latency and high throughput compared
to other popular schemes such as PoW. We note that such a choice
comes at a certain cost: PoW is known to have better security,
since it tolerates up to 50% Byzantine nodes while PBFT tolerates
only 30% [68]. Acknowledging that, and giving latency a higher
priority over security, in BlockAudit, we made the consensus choice
to minimize the latency.
The other component of latency is due to the network, which
includes transmission and propagation delays under a certain pay-
load size. In BlockAudit, and as shown in Figure 9, with a payload of
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10MB and a network of 50 replicas, the transaction confirmation ex-
periences a delay of 6 seconds. In BlockAudit, this is an upper bound
on the end-to-end latency, which is considerably low compared
to 600 seconds of delay in Bitcoin. For our Enterprise application,
this delay is tolerable. However, if BlockAudit is to be extended for
applications with larger payloads, we suggest two improvements as
the latency increases. First, the communication medium between
applications can be enhanced to support high bandwidth. Second,
localities could be exploited to host applications within the same
autonomous system to reduce propagation delays. Implementing
these improvements is a future work.
Optimization. To increase the performance and to keep the au-
dit log tamper-proof, we propose having two sets of blockchains,
namely the recovery blockchain, and the detection blockchain. In Fig-
ure 10 we provide a system overview of this two blockchain system.
The recovery blockchain stores the complete audit log transaction,
including details of all data changes in an application-level transac-
tion. The recovery blockchain can be used to restore data to its prior
state, which would be the state of data before an attack. The recovery
blockchain would require more space, and longer consensus time
due to large transaction audit data packets. The number of peers k
in the recovery blockchain can be kept small to ensure immediate
consensus and avoid delays. Since the security of PBFT relies on the
faithful execution of the protocol by at least 70% replicas, therefore
for a baseline, the minimum size of the recovery blockchain must be
four nodes considering one malicious replica (k ≥ 4).
The detection blockchain can be used to detect audit log tamper-
ing only. It will not have the information to recover the audit log
to a correct state before the attack. The business application will
generate a cryptographic hash using the audit transaction. The hash
and a unique transaction identifier will be stored in the blockchain.
In the case of data tampering in the audit log, the newly computed
hash will not match the hash stored in an audit log. This will indi-
cate that the audit log has tampered. Once tampering is detected,
application administrators could use corrective measures to fix the
security breach. Atop that, data can could be restored to the pre-
vious state by using database backups. The recovery blockchain
which will haveKd peers, whereKd > 2K . Therefore, the adversary
will have to compromise twice as many nodes to tamper the system
without being detected. This optimization increases security and
provides a second layer of defense.
Despite the existing challenges, BlockAudit is a feasible approach
towards blockchain-based secure audit logs. Extending the capabili-
ties of the prior work, BlockAudit brings the theoretical foundations
into practice and as shown in section 7, it has been deployed and
instrumented in a real blockchain network. Moreover, BlockAudit is
also capable of ensuring operational consistency even in the pres-
ence of Byzantine replicas. Therefore, it is a better candidate for the
audit log security and can be applied to eGovernment solutions.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a blockchain-based audit log system called
BlockAudit, that leverages the security features of blockchain tech-
nology to create distributed, append-only, and tamper-proof audit
logs. We highlight the security vulnerabilities in existing audit log
applications and propose a new design that extends NHibernate
ORM to create blockchain-driven audit logs. For our experiment,
we used an application provided by ClearVillage inc to generate
transactions from audit logs, and record them in our custom built
blockchain. By design, BlockAudit is agile, plug and play, and se-
cure against internal and external attacks. In the future, we will
extend the capabilities of BlockAudit by deploying it in a produc-
tion environment and explore various performance bottlenecks and
optimization techniques.
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